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CAUSATION IN CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION 
Hillel J. Bavli* 
Employees are often left unprotected from discrimination because they are unable to satisfy the requirement 
of causation. Courts have made clear that to obtain legal redress for discrimination, it is generally 
insufficient to show that a protected characteristic such as race or sex was a “motivating factor” of an 
adverse employment decision. Rather, under Supreme Court precedent—including the Court’s Comcast 
and Babb decisions in the 2020 term—the antidiscrimination statutes generally require a showing of 
“but-for” causation. Consequently, many victims of discrimination will be unable to prevail because an 
employer can readily refute allegations of discrimination by asserting a legitimate purpose—true or not—
for the adverse decision. Therefore, although there is good reason to reject the motivating-factor test, the 
but-for requirement undermines the objectives of antidiscrimination law. 
 
In this Article, I draw on notions of cause and effect in the sciences and in tort law to propose a new 
standard of causation for antidiscrimination law. In particular, I formulate a simple test—which I call 
the “fortified NESS” test, or “FNESS”—for courts and legislatures to apply as a uniform and effective 
standard of causation in all disparate-treatment cases. I then employ this formulation to propose concrete 
amendments to the civil rights statutes, and I demonstrate why these amendments are necessary and how 
they allow courts to uphold the critical aims of antidiscrimination law. 
INTRODUCTION 
Employees are often left unprotected from discrimination. An employee 
who is passed over for hire or promotion due to sex, race, religion, or another 
protected characteristic is often left with little ability to obtain legal redress. 
To establish a claim for disparate treatment, a plaintiff must prove that a 
characteristic protected by the antidiscrimination laws caused the alleged adverse 
outcome.1 “Few legal principles are better established than the rule requiring a 
plaintiff to establish causation.”2 This is the battleground on which disparate-
treatment claims are frequently decided. While causation is a difficult issue in 
torts cases generally, it is particularly difficult in discrimination cases, in which 
establishing causation requires understanding the complex motivations 
underlying an actor’s employment or contracting decisions.3 
It is by now clear that to obtain legal redress for discrimination under the 
nation’s civil rights statutes, it is generally insufficient to show that a protected 
 
*  Assistant Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law; Affiliated Faculty, Harvard Institute for 
Quantitative Social Science. The author wishes to thank Barry Goldstein, Michael Green, Sandra Sperino, 
and Eric Ruben for their helpful comments, and Laura Sundin for her outstanding editing and research 
assistance. 
1.  Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 342 (2013) (“When the law grants persons the 
right to compensation for injury from wrongful conduct, there must be some demonstrated connection, some 
link, between the injury sustained and the wrong alleged. The requisite relation between prohibited conduct 
and compensable injury is governed by the principles of causation . . . .”). 
2.  Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1013 (2020). 
3.  See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239–42 (1989). 
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characteristic was a “motivating factor” of an adverse decision.4 Rather, as 
demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s many decisions regarding causation in 
antidiscrimination law—including its Comcast and Babb decisions in the 2020 
term—the antidiscrimination statutes generally require a showing of “but-for” 
causation.5 That is, to obtain damages or remedial injunctive relief for 
discrimination, it is generally necessary to demonstrate that in the absence of 
the discrimination, or of the protected characteristic in particular, the adverse 
outcome would not have occurred.6 
This is problematic. Courts and legislatures reject the motivating-factor test 
as a standard of causation because rather than reflecting actual cause and effect, 
it ambiguously asks the factfinder to determine whether the protected 
characteristic played a role in the actor’s decision.7 Effectively, it is a test of 
responsibility based on intuition rather than a test of factual causation, thus 
violating the bedrock torts principle requiring a plaintiff to prove causation.8 
However, the but-for test is overly restrictive. In the context of complex and 
multifaceted employment decisions, the stringent requirements of but-for 
causation frequently end claims of disparate treatment before they begin.9 
Consequently, the but-for standard—the predominant test of causation in 
antidiscrimination law—prevents the antidiscrimination statutes from fulfilling 
their critical objectives.10 
Consider, for example, a case in which a female employee, Michelle, alleged 
that her employer promoted a male employee over her based on the employer’s 
sexist view that male employees are more capable than female employees. 
Assume, however, that Michelle’s employer can show that Michelle was less 
qualified for the promotion or that she simply performed worse than her male 
colleague. Under the but-for standard of causation, Michelle is unlikely to 
establish a discrimination claim against her employer, even if Michelle’s 
allegations are true. As a definitional matter, Michelle’s claim fails to meet the 
but-for test because, even in the absence of the employer’s discrimination, the 
employer is likely to have promoted the male employee over Michelle. 
Moreover, as an evidentiary matter, regardless of whether Michelle would have 
 
4.  See infra Part I.A. 
5.  See Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1013–16; Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 1177–78 (2020). 
6.  See Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1014 (“Under [the but-for] standard, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
that, but for the defendant’s unlawful conduct, its alleged injury would not have occurred.”); DAN B. DOBBS 
ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS 317 (2d ed. 2016). I use the term “remedial injunctive relief” to refer to 
injunctive relief related to the outcome of the employment decision. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B); 
Babb, 140 S. Ct. at 1177–78 (“[P]laintiffs who demonstrate only that they were subjected to unequal 
consideration cannot obtain reinstatement, backpay, compensatory damages, or other forms of relief related 
to the end result of an employment decision.”). 
7.  See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 6, at 323. 
8.  See infra Part I.B. 
9.  See infra Part I.A. 
10. See Hillel J. Bavli, Cause and Effect in Antidiscrimination Law, 106 IOWA L. REV. 483, 485 (2021) 
[hereinafter Cause and Effect]. 
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been promoted had she been a male employee, it would be difficult for Michelle 
to prove that her employer’s motivation was discriminatory. Employment 
decisions are complex, and an employer can frequently refute allegations of 
discrimination by asserting a legitimate purpose for the adverse decision.11 
Thus, courts and legislatures have been forced to choose between two 
inadequate standards of causation.12 By permitting liability based on intuition 
regarding responsibility rather than a finding of cause and effect, the 
motivating-factor test violates fundamental principles of fairness and tort law 
and has therefore been rejected clearly and repeatedly by courts and 
legislatures.13 On the other hand, the but-for test forecloses redress for victims 
of discrimination, thereby disincentivizing discrimination claims and thwarting 
the deterrence and fairness objectives of federal and state antidiscrimination 
statutes.14 
This situation has created a “swamp” of inconsistent and frequently 
incoherent rules and conditions as courts have sought to apply a but-for 
standard in order to uphold legislative intent and basic principles of tort law, 
while deviating from this standard in order to obtain intuitive outcomes in 
particular cases.15 As a consequence of this situation, judgments in disparate-
treatment cases are frequently inconsistent with the aims of the 
antidiscrimination statutes.16 Moreover, the law is rife with difficulties and 
inconsistencies, and similar cases can arbitrarily result in different causal 
standards and different outcomes based on intricacies in the language of a 
statute.17 Additionally, there are circuit splits regarding the causal standard 
applicable to a particular statute, as well as inconsistencies within circuits.18 
Notwithstanding numerous Supreme Court decisions regarding causation in 
disparate-treatment cases, the Court has failed to supply necessary clarification 
or a logical standard. Instead, the Supreme Court and lower courts have 
continued to choose between two inadequate standards and to compensate for 
their inadequacies by applying ad hoc measures that have caused the law to 
become increasingly complex and illogical.19 
 
11.  Id. at 485–86. 
12.  Id. at 487. 
13.  See infra Part I. 
14.  See infra Part I. 
15.  Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment (Really), 59 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 645 n.8 (2008) (“Courts 
and commentators have routinely referred to current disparate treatment doctrine as a ‘swamp,’ a ‘morass,’ 
and a ‘quagmire.’” (citing Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 851–53 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 539 U.S. 
90 (2003), and other sources)); see Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 487. 
16.  See infra Part I.B; see also Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 490–504, 536–49. 
17.  See infra Part I.A. 
18.  See generally BARBARA T. LINDEMANN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 13-197–99 
(5th ed. 2012). 
19.  See infra Part I; see also Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 487, 490–501. 
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To address this high-stakes problem, I have proposed a third possibility—
a standard of causation that, unlike the but-for and motivating-factor tests, 
satisfies both legislative intent and good policy, and reflects the meaning of 
actual cause and effect.20 The proposed causal framework makes three 
innovations for causation in antidiscrimination law. 
First, it employs the “potential-outcomes” model—a predominant model 
for conceptualizing and proving cause and effect in the sciences—to introduce 
a standard of causation that applies the but-for test’s central feature, the 
“necessity condition,” but in a less restrictive form.21 By appropriately placing 
the causal inquiry within this broader counterfactual model, the proposed 
framework not only permits a causal measure that retains the analytical structure 
of the but-for test, as well as the actual, scientific, and common meaning of 
cause and effect, but also permits a finding of causation in a far broader set of 
situations.22 Second, the proposed framework employs the NESS (Necessary 
Element of a Sufficient Set) test as its measure of causation.23 This test is 
satisfied if a factor “was necessary for the sufficiency of a set of existing 
antecedent conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of the 
consequence.”24 When applied within the broader potential-outcomes 
framework, this test serves as a refinement of the but-for and motivating-factor 
tests, and it provides an appropriate standard of actual causation that fulfills the 
objectives of antidiscrimination law.25 Finally, the proposed framework views 
“mixed-motive” disparate-treatment claims as a special type of torts claim.26 In 
particular, it applies a basic torts structure of proof, and it treats these claims as 
a type of “multiple-sufficient-cause” (msc) situation—a situation in tort law in 
which two or more forces produce an outcome where each force alone would 
have produced the same outcome.27 
The proposed framework functionalizes the NESS test for the 
antidiscrimination context by embedding it in a robust counterfactual model of 
cause and effect and by supplying a conceptual framework that permits its 
logical application. By applying the NESS test within the potential-outcomes 
 
20.  See Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 487. 
21.  See id. at 487–88. 
22.  See id. at 488. 
23.  See id. 
24.  Richard W. Wright, The Grounds and Extent of Legal Responsibility, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1425, 1441 
(2003) [hereinafter Wright, Grounds and Extent]; Richard W. Wright, Once More into the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal 
Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1071, 1102–03 (2001). 
25.  See Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 488. 
26.  Id. at 489. 
27.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 (AM. 
L. INST. 2010); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 6, at 321; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 266 (5th ed. 1984) (“[T]here is one type of situation in which [the but-for test] 
fails. If two causes concur to bring about an event, and either one of them, operating alone, would have been 
sufficient to cause the identical result, some other test is needed.”). 
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model, the proposed approach in a sense fortifies the NESS test and permits 
its application as an ideal standard of causation in antidiscrimination law.28 
In this Article, I operationalize the proposed framework by encapsulating 
it in a simple test—which I call the “fortified NESS” test, or “FNESS”—for 
courts and legislatures to apply as a uniform and effective standard of causation 
in all disparate-treatment cases. I show that, combined with the conceptual 
framework provided by the potential-outcomes model, the NESS test can serve 
as a logical standard that avoids the substantial problems associated with the 
but-for and motivating-factor tests. I then apply this standard to propose 
legislation. In particular, I argue that, although courts can and arguably should 
apply the proposed FNESS standard under the current antidiscrimination 
statutes, in light of FNESS and the substantial inadequacies of the but-for and 
motivating-factor tests, it is insufficient for legislatures to leave the causal 
standard in these statutes open to judicial interpretation. I therefore apply the 
FNESS formulation to propose concrete amendments to the nation’s civil 
rights statutes in line with this standard, and I demonstrate why these 
amendments are necessary and how they allow courts to uphold the critical aims 
of antidiscrimination law. 
In Part I, I provide a brief overview of the state of disarray surrounding 
causation in disparate-treatment cases, and I discuss explicitly the inadequacies 
of the but-for and motivating-factor tests. In Part II, I formulate the FNESS 
standard, and I show how it applies as an effective standard of causation in 
antidiscrimination law, and disparate-treatment cases in particular. Then, I apply 
this formulation to propose concrete amendments to Title VII,29 the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),30 the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA),31 the Civil Rights Act of 1866,32 and other antidiscrimination 
statutes. In Part III, I discuss implications of the proposed standard and 
amendments. In particular, I discuss judicial interpretation of causal language 
in antidiscrimination statutes, and I explain why the proposed amendments are 
necessary and how they restore logic and effectiveness in antidiscrimination law. 
 
28.  The proposed approach also promotes its application as an ideal standard of causation in tort law 
more broadly. 
29.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
30.  29 U.S.C. § 623. 
31.  42 U.S.C. § 12112. 
32.  Id. § 1981. 
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I. CAUSATION IN DISPARATE-TREATMENT CASES 
A. Current Standards 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination “because 
of [an] individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”33 To establish a 
claim, a plaintiff must prove a causal link between the defendant’s 
discriminatory conduct and the alleged adverse employment decision.34 
However, this can be extraordinarily difficult under the but-for test. After all, 
employment decisions are complex and frequently involve multiple factors, 
some of which may be legitimate and sufficient for the adverse decision. 
Moreover, regardless of whether an employer was in fact motivated by a 
legitimate purpose, it is frequently easy for an employer to contrive a legitimate 
purpose for the adverse decision.35 
For these reasons, Title VII involves a complicated proof scheme 
surrounding the issue of causation. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the 
Supreme Court held that to establish a prima facie discrimination claim under 
Title VII, the plaintiff must show: 
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified 
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his 
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position 
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons 
of complainant’s qualifications.36 
Upon such a showing, under McDonnell Douglas, “[t]he burden then must 
shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for the employee’s rejection.”37 Then, the plaintiff “must . . . be afforded a fair 
opportunity to show that [the employer’s] stated reason for [the plaintiff’s] 
rejection was in fact pretext”—“that the presumptively valid reasons for his 
rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision.”38 
In 1989, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court again addressed 
the meaning of Title VII’s causation requirement, and particularly its “because 
of” language.39 Six Justices agreed (although not in a majority opinion) on a 
burden-shifting proof scheme that involved (1) a plaintiff proving his or her 
claim by showing that “one of the prohibited traits was a ‘motivating’ or 
‘substantial’ factor in the employer’s decision,” followed by (2) a defendant 
 
33.  Id. § 2000e-2(a). 
34.  See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 342 (2013). 
35.  See Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 486. 
36.  411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
37.  Id. 
38.  Id. at 804–05. 
39.  490 U.S. 228, 239–47 (1989) (plurality opinion); Nassar, 570 U.S. at 348. 
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“prov[ing] that it would have taken the same employment action in the absence 
of all discriminatory animus”—i.e., “that a discriminatory motive was not the 
but-for cause of the adverse employment action.”40 
Shortly after Price Waterhouse, “Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 
1991.”41 “This statute . . . codified the burden-shifting and lessened-causation 
framework of Price Waterhouse in part but also rejected it to a substantial 
degree.”42 The statute provides that “[a]n unlawful employment practice is 
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, 
even though other factors also motivated the practice.”43 But it also “abrogated 
a portion of Price Waterhouse’s framework by removing the employer’s ability to 
defeat liability once a plaintiff proved the existence of an impermissible 
motivating factor.”44 At the same time, however, the statute provides that if 
“[the employer] demonstrates that [it] would have taken the same action in the 
absence of the impermissible motivating factor,” the plaintiff may obtain 
“declaratory relief, injunctive relief . . . and [limited] attorney’s fees and costs” 
but not “damages or . . . an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, 
promotion, or payment . . . .”45 In summary, a plaintiff who proves 
discrimination under the motivating-factor test but not under the but-for test 
“could obtain declaratory relief, attorney’s fees and costs, and some forms of 
injunctive relief” but could not obtain “monetary damages [or] a reinstatement 
order.”46  
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 therefore explicitly incorporates the 
motivating-factor test as an alternative to proving but-for causation. However, 
the statute arguably also renders claims under the motivating-factor test 
relatively ineffective (with respect to the deterrence and fairness47 objectives of 
the statute) because it disallows damages and remedial injunctive relief for 
claims established only under this standard.48 
The Supreme Court again addressed the meaning of causation in disparate-
treatment claims in 2009, in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,49 and again in 
 
40.  Nassar, 570 U.S. at 348 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (plurality opinion); id. at 259–60 
(White J., concurring); id. at 276–77 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. 
43.  Id. at 348–49 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). 
44.  Id. at 349. 
      45.    Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)). 
46.  Id. 
47.  Throughout this Article, I use the term “fairness” to include compensation and other remedial 
goals of the antidiscrimination statutes. 
      48.  Importantly, if a plaintiff establishes a claim under the motivating-factor test and the employer is 
unable to show that “[it] would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating 
factor,” then the plaintiff is not excluded from recovering damages and remedial injunctive relief under the 
statute. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 349 (alterations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)). 
49.  557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
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2013, in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar.50 In Gross, the 
Supreme Court interpreted causal language in the ADEA, which forbids 
discrimination “because of [an] individual’s age.”51 The Court held that “[t]he 
words ‘because of’ mean ‘by reason of: on account of,’” and that “the ordinary 
meaning of the ADEA’s requirement that an employer took adverse action 
‘because of’ age is that age was the ‘reason’ that the employer decided to act.”52 
The Court thus rejected arguments in favor of applying Title VII’s burden-
shifting framework, holding that “[t]o establish a disparate-treatment claim 
under the plain language of the ADEA, . . . a plaintiff must prove that age was 
the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse decision.”53 
In Nassar, the Supreme Court interpreted causal language in Title VII’s 
antiretaliation provision, which forbids retaliation against an employee 
“because” he has challenged or assisted in challenging a discriminatory 
employment practice under Title VII.54 The Court once again interpreted the 
language of the statute at issue, and specifically the term “because,” to require 
a but-for standard.55 In arriving at its conclusion, the Court analyzed principles 
of causation in the broader torts context and examined Supreme Court 
precedent regarding causation and the meaning of causal terms such as 
“because of.”56 It ultimately held that a plaintiff seeking to prove a Title VII 
retaliation claim must prove “that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause 
of the challenged employment action.”57 
In two separate decisions in 2020, the Supreme Court again turned its 
attention to the issue of causation in disparate-treatment claims.58 In Comcast 
Corp. v. National Ass’n of African American-Owned Media, Entertainment Studios 
Network and the National Association of African American-Owned Media 
brought an action against Comcast under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for discrimination 
based on race in “mak[ing] and enforc[ing] contracts.”59 In response, Comcast 
“offered legitimate business reasons” for its adverse contractual decisions.60 
 
50.  570 U.S. 338. 
51.  29 U.S.C. § 623(a). 
52.  Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 (quoting 1 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 194 
(1966)). 
53.  Id. 
54.  Nassar, 570 U.S. at 352; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (prohibiting retaliation against an employee 
“because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because 
he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or 
hearing under this subchapter”). 
55.  See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 352. 
56.  Id. at 346–52. 
57.  Id. at 352. 
58.  See Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020); Babb v. 
Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168 (2020); see also Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). 
59.  140 S. Ct. at 1013 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981). 
60.  Id. 
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The Supreme Court held unanimously that § 1981 requires a plaintiff to prove 
that discrimination was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse outcome.61 
The Court’s decision begins by clearly stating the ironclad requirement of 
causation and its meaning: “Few legal principles are better established than the 
rule requiring a plaintiff to establish causation. In the law of torts, this usually 
means a plaintiff must first plead and then prove that its injury would not have 
occurred ‘but for’ the defendant’s unlawful conduct.”62 The Court applied well-
established Supreme Court precedent and held that “[t]his ancient and simple 
‘but for’ common law causation test . . . supplies the ‘default’ or ‘background’ 
rule against which Congress is normally presumed to have legislated when 
creating its own new causes of action,” and that “[n]ormally, too, the essential 
elements of a claim remain constant through the life of a lawsuit.”63 As in earlier 
cases, the Court analyzed the meaning of causal terms such as “because of,” 
“on the basis of,” and “on account of,” as well as precedent regarding causation, 
and ruled that these terms imply a but-for standard.64 
The decision in Comcast can be contrasted with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Babb v. Wilkie, which the Court handed down only a few weeks 
later.65 In Babb, a clinical pharmacist brought an action against her employer, 
the Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center (VA), under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 633a(a), the federal-sector provision of the ADEA, for age-based 
discrimination.66 In this case, as in Comcast, the defendant “offered non-
discriminatory reasons for the challenged actions.”67 In contrast to Comcast, 
however, the Court held that “age need not be a but-for cause of an 
employment decision in order for there to be a violation of § 633a(a).”68 
Contrary to Comcast, the Court held that the relevant language of § 633a(a)—
that “[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment 
who are at least 40 years of age . . . shall be made free from any discrimination 
based on age”—implies a standard more in line with the motivating-factor 
test.69 In particular, the Court held that “[t]he plain meaning of the critical 
statutory language (‘made free from any discrimination based on age’) demands 
that personnel actions be untainted by any consideration of age.”70 
Thus, according to the Court, under § 633a(a), “age need not be a but-for 
cause of an employment decision in order for there to be a violation of [the 
 
61.  See id. at 1013–16. 
62.  Id. at 1013. 
63.  Id. at 1014 (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 346–47 (2013)). 
64.  See id. at 1014–16. 
65.  Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168 (2020). 
66.  Id. at 1171. 
67.  Id. at 1171–72. 
68.  Id. at 1172. 
69.  Id. at 1172–74 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a)). 
70.  Id. at 1171 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a)). 
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statute].”71 Instead, the Court applied an “any-consideration” standard that 
seems to be a form of the motivating-factor test and permits a finding of liability 
even if age, although considered, made no difference (in a but-for sense) in the 
employment decision.72 
At the same time, however, the Court placed severe limits on the relief 
available to a plaintiff who is able to prove her case under the any-consideration 
test but not the but-for test. The Court reaffirmed “that but-for causation is 
important in determining [an] appropriate remedy,” and that “[i]t is bedrock law 
that ‘requested relief’ must ‘redress the alleged injury.’”73 The Court then held 
that “plaintiffs who demonstrate only that they were subjected to unequal 
consideration cannot obtain reinstatement, backpay, compensatory damages, or 
other forms of relief related to the end result of an employment decision.”74 
According to the Court, “To obtain such remedies, these plaintiffs must show 
that age discrimination was a but-for cause of the employment outcome.”75 
One interpretation of the Court’s decision in Babb (and decisions in other 
disparate-treatment cases) is this: Due to the circumstances surrounding 
disparate-treatment claims—and specifically, the difficulty of proving but-for 
causation and the under-effectiveness of a statute that would require a plaintiff 
to meet this standard—it is plausible, based on the “free from any 
discrimination” language of § 633a(a), that Congress did not intend for the but-
for standard to apply, notwithstanding the ironclad principle requiring a 
plaintiff to prove causation. However, because proof of causation is central to 
a claim, and because the Court could not, based on the most strongly rooted 
principles of law, award damages for injury that was not caused by the alleged 
misconduct, a plaintiff could establish liability and “seek injunctive or other 
forward-looking relief” but could not obtain damages or “other forms of relief 
related to the end result of an employment decision.”76 
Therefore, as with Title VII claims, based on the language of § 633a(a), a 
plaintiff can rely on a form of the motivating-factor test as an alternative to 
proving but-for causation. But, once again, the statute is arguably rendered 
ineffective under the motivating-factor test because, pursuant to the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation, it disallows damages and remedial injunctive relief for 
claims established under this standard. 
 
71.  Id. at 1172. 
72.  See id. at 1174; see also id. at 1179 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing “[t]his novel ‘any consideration’ 
standard”). 
73.  Id. at 1177 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)); see also Comcast 
Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1014 (2020) (“It is ‘textbook tort law’ that a 
plaintiff seeking redress for a defendant’s legal wrong typically must prove but-for causation.” (quoting Univ. 
of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 347 (2013))). 
74.  Babb, 140 S. Ct. at 1177–78. 
75.  Id. at 1177–78. 
76.  Id. 
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The Comcast and Babb decisions follow a long line of Supreme Court 
decisions regarding causation in disparate-treatment claims. Unfortunately, 
these decisions, like earlier ones, provide neither clarity nor satisfying results. In 
this Part, I focused on a few Supreme Court decisions surrounding particular 
antidiscrimination statutes. However, it is important to realize that the 
frequency with which the issue of causation in disparate-treatment claims is 
addressed by the Supreme Court is indicative of the difficulty of the issue, the 
state of disarray in law surrounding the issue, and the pressing need for an 
improved standard. Moreover, the state of confusion, instability, and 
ineffectiveness that surrounds the statutes discussed extends beyond these 
statutes to other federal statutes—such as the ADA—as well as to state 
antidiscrimination laws.77 
The discussion above suggests a few important takeaways: 
(1) The law surrounding standards of causation in antidiscrimination law—
and disparate-treatment cases in particular—is in a state of disarray. It 
is complex, inconsistent, and ineffective, and courts have struggled 
immensely to resolve the underlying inadequacies in existing standards 
of causation. 
(2) The Supreme Court and lower courts determine causal standards based 
on the language of each individual antidiscrimination statute. Combined 
with a choice between two inadequate causal standards, this has resulted 
in a variety of standards across statutes, even if the aims and policies 
underlying the statutes are the same. 
(3) Courts and legislatures are reluctant to allow plaintiffs to rely on the 
motivating-factor test (and derivative tests, such as Babb’s any-
consideration test) as an alternative to the but-for test, and when they 
permit a plaintiff to rely solely on the motivating-factor test, they 
generally place severe limits on the relief that is available to such a 
plaintiff. In particular, they generally disallow damages and remedial 
injunctive relief.78 
(4) The 2020 Supreme Court decisions in Comcast and Babb are indicative of 
the broader problem. The Supreme Court and lower courts continue to 
struggle with the inadequacies of the but-for and motivating-factor 
tests—but to no avail. As in previous cases, the Court analyzed the 
language of the statutes in the respective cases and determined two 
distinct standards of causation in these cases. 
(5) Like previous decisions regarding causation in antidiscrimination law, 
the decisions in Comcast and Babb employ complex logic (e.g., “age must 
 
77.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (prohibiting discrimination against “individual[s] on the basis of disability 
in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment”); see also, e.g., 
LINDEMANN ET AL., supra note 18 (discussing causation standards in ADA claims). 
      78.  See supra notes 41–48, 65–76, and accompanying text. 
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be a but-for cause of discrimination—that is, of differential treatment—
but not necessarily a but-for cause of a personnel action itself”79) and 
result in unsatisfying standards—with the Court holding in one case that 
a discriminatory defendant could avoid liability as long as the 
discrimination is accompanied by a sufficient nondiscriminatory factor, 
and the Court holding in the other case that a plaintiff may establish a 
claim in such circumstances but obtain no damages or remedial 
injunctive relief as a result.80 
B. The Inadequacy of the But-For Test and the Motivating-Factor Test 
The primary objectives of the antidiscrimination statutes are deterrence and 
fairness. As Justice O’Connor stated in her concurring opinion in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins: 
Like the common law of torts, the statutory employment “tort” created by 
Title VII has two basic purposes. The first is to deter conduct which has been 
identified as contrary to public policy and harmful to society as a whole. As 
we have noted in the past, the award of backpay to a Title VII plaintiff 
provides “the spur or catalyst which causes employers and unions to self-
examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to 
eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges” of discrimination in 
employment. The second goal of Title VII is “to make persons whole for 
injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.”81 
Additionally, causation must reflect actual cause and effect. Whether 
understood as a fundamental component of the fairness and deterrence 
objectives of antidiscrimination law or as a standalone principle, it is an ironclad 
requirement of tort law that a plaintiff must prove a causal connection between 
the defendant’s misconduct and the harm to the plaintiff, and that this 
connection must reflect cause and effect in the common and scientific sense of 
the term.82 As the Supreme Court stated in the first sentence of Comcast, “Few 
 
79.  Babb, 140 S. Ct. at 1173. 
80.  See supra notes 58–76 and accompanying text. 
81.  490 U.S. 228, 264–65 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (quoting Albemarle 
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–18 (1975)); see supra note 47. 
82.  See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 342 (2013) (“When the law grants persons 
the right to compensation for injury from wrongful conduct, there must be some demonstrated connection, 
some link, between the injury sustained and the wrong alleged. The requisite relation between prohibited 
conduct and compensable injury is governed by the principles of causation . . . .”); James E. Viator, Note, 
When Cause-in-Fact Is More than a Fact: The Malone-Green Debate on the Role of Policy in Determining Factual Causation 
in Tort Law, 44 LA. L. REV. 1519, 1526–27 (1984) (“A common belief . . . is that policy considerations have 
no role to play in the determination of cause-in-fact, ‘because no policy can be strong enough to warrant the 
imposition of liability for loss to which the defendant’s conduct has not in fact contributed.’” (quoting JOHN 
G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 170 (6th ed. 1983))); see also James A. Macleod, Ordinary Causation: A Study 
in Experimental Statutory Interpretation, 94 IND. L.J. 957, 958–61, 966–85 (2019). 
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legal principles are better established than the rule requiring a plaintiff to 
establish causation.”83 
The but-for test satisfies this foundational principle of law. Moreover, it 
comports with intuition and good policy in a very high proportion of cases in 
tort law (and law generally). But the but-for test is too stringent, and this 
weakness is brought to the fore in disparate-treatment cases. It is well-accepted 
that in msc situations, “the but-for test denies the existence of cause in fact 
while everything in human experience and intuition cries out that cause in fact 
was present.”84 In disparate-treatment cases—a special type of msc situation—
the but-for test frequently precludes a finding of liability. First, it prevents a 
finding of liability definitionally when there is a sufficient legitimate purpose for 
an adverse outcome, even when the defendant’s discrimination alone would 
have been sufficient for the same outcome.85 Second, it also prevents findings 
of liability evidentiarily because it is difficult to prove an employer’s true 
motivations for an employment decision, and it is easy for an employer to 
invent a sufficient nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse decision—even 
when discrimination was the true cause of the decision.86 
As in other msc situations, the but-for test is inadequate as applied to 
disparate-treatment claims. As one prominent torts treatise states: “[T]here is 
one type of situation in which [the but-for test] fails. If two causes concur to 
bring about an event, and either one of them, operating alone, would have been 
sufficient to cause the identical result, some other test is needed.”87 It is well-
accepted that—in the words of another leading torts treatise—“[t]he but-for 
test in such cases leads to a result that is almost always condemned as violating 
both an intuitive sense of causation and good legal policy.”88 
Most significantly, the but-for test yields outcomes that are contrary to the 
policy objectives of the antidiscrimination statutes. As Justice O’Connor 
remarked: 
There is no doubt that Congress considered reliance on gender or race in 
making employment decisions an evil in itself. . . . Reliance on such factors is 
exactly what the threat of Title VII liability was meant to deter. While the main 
concern of the statute was with employment opportunity, Congress was 
certainly not blind to the stigmatic harm which comes from being evaluated 
by a process which treats one as an inferior by reason of one’s race or sex. 
This Court’s decisions under the Equal Protection Clause have long 
recognized that whatever the final outcome of a decisional process, the 
inclusion of race or sex as a consideration within it harms both society and 
 
83.  Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1013 (2020). 
84.  David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1777 (1997); see also 
Macleod, supra note 82, at 961, 991–1012. 
85.  See Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 485–86. 
86.  Id. 
87.  KEETON ET AL., supra note 27, at 266 (discussing msc situations). 
88.  DOBBS ET AL., supra note 6, at 321. 
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the individual. At the same time, Congress clearly conditioned legal liability on 
a determination that the consideration of an illegitimate factor caused a tangible 
employment injury of some kind.89 
The but-for test under-deters and under-compensates. It requires a finding 
of no liability when discrimination is accompanied by a sufficient legitimate 
purpose, and it permits a finding of no liability in a wide range of cases in which 
discrimination may be masked retroactively by evidence regarding the 
possibility of a nondiscriminatory purpose. In turn, victims of discrimination 
are less likely to recover damages and therefore less likely to initiate 
discrimination actions, and employers are substantially less deterred from 
discriminating.  
On the other hand, the motivating-factor test is at least equally problematic. 
First, it is not a test of factual causation. As discussed above, a central principle 
of tort law is that a plaintiff may only recover damages for misconduct that in 
fact caused her harm.90 But the motivating-factor test does not reflect causation 
in any common, scientific, or philosophic sense. It asks the factfinder to 
determine an apportioning of responsibility based on intuition rather than to 
determine a question of factual causation. It is a particular form of tort law’s 
“substantial factor test,” which is well-understood to be “not so much a test as 
an incantation.”91 Specifically, it “points neither to any reasoning nor to any 
facts that will assist courts or lawyers in resolving the question of causation. Put 
differently, the substantial factor test requires no particular mental operation. It 
invites the jury’s intuition.”92 
Relatedly, the motivating-factor test does not have a consistent or 
meaningful definition. It is intentionally vague.93 For example, if a racist 
employer refused to hire an African-American applicant, but the applicant also 
did not meet minimal requirements of the position—e.g., a driver’s license for 
a driving position or a medical degree for a position as a medical doctor—a jury 
could apply the motivating-factor test to make a finding of causation or a finding 
of no causation. The test provides no guidance in this regard. Indeed, a jury could 
arguably make a finding of causation even if there was no job opening in the 
first instance, or even if the plaintiff was offered a position. Similarly, a racist or 
sexist jury could find that there was no causation in cases in which a causal link 
clearly existed. 
 
89.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 265 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation 
omitted). 
90.  Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1013 (2020) (“Few legal 
principles are better established than the rule requiring a plaintiff to establish causation.”). 
91.  DOBBS ET AL., supra note 6, at 323. 
92.  Id. 
93.  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 
cmt. j (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“The substantial-factor test has not . . . withstood the test of time, as it has proved 
confusing and been misused.”). 
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Because the motivating-factor test relies on intuition regarding 
responsibility rather than any particular logic or analytical process regarding 
causation, the causal determination under the motivating-factor test is 
unpredictable. Frequently, the jury can decide the matter however it likes, 
regardless of whether its determination is connected to how other juries would 
decide the matter or whether it is tethered to any meaningful conception of 
causation. This unpredictability has important implications not only for the 
law’s fairness objectives (implications inherent in the unpredictability) but also 
for its deterrence objectives. For example, it may cause overdeterrence in the 
form of socially undesirable practices by employers and suboptimal levels of 
job offerings, promotion offerings, and other employment opportunities. It 
may also cause underdeterrence if juries in a particular region are known to be 
more lenient for employers. Finally, it may lead to windfall recoveries and 
undesirable incentives for employees. 
Oddly, the motivating-factor test implicitly asks the jury to make its 
determination based on policy rather than fact—that is, based on the jury’s 
intuition regarding responsibility. However, the jury is provided with no 
direction for how to accomplish this. The jury is not informed of the law’s 
deterrence or fairness objectives, or other guiding principles.94 Rather, it is 
simply expected to intuit a determination. 
For the above reasons, the motivating-factor test cannot be said to be a 
standard of causation or to fulfill antidiscrimination law’s broader fairness and 
deterrence objectives. For this reason, it has not been—and is unlikely to be—
adopted as the standard of causation in antidiscrimination law. We have seen 
that under certain statutes and Supreme Court decisions, the motivating-factor 
test can play a role—generally as an ancillary, catch-all test.95 But when this 
occurs, the relief available to a plaintiff who proves a claim under only the 
motivating-factor test is severely limited. Generally, such a plaintiff may be able 
to obtain certain forms of injunctive relief, costs, and fees, but cannot recover 
damages or remedial injunctive relief. 
For example, as discussed above, Title VII provides that a plaintiff who 
proves causation only under the motivating-factor test—i.e., under the 
motivating-factor test but not under the but-for test—can obtain “declaratory 
relief, injunctive relief . . . and [certain] attorney’s fees and costs,” but not 
“damages or . . . an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, 
promotion, or payment . . . .”96 Similarly, in the recent case Babb v. Wilkie, 
 
94.  Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 539–40. For a detailed discussion of the inadequacies of the but-
for and motivating-factor tests, see id. at Parts II–III. 
95.  See supra Part I.A. 
96.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i)–(ii); see supra notes 39–48 and accompanying text. To the extent 
that Title VII’s burden-shifting scheme gains effectiveness by shifting the burden to the defendant to 
demonstrate that there was a sufficient legitimate purpose for an adverse outcome—i.e., that the outcome 
would have been the same regardless of whether there was discrimination—this benefit only goes so far. See 
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although the statute at issue, 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a), included extremely liberal 
language (“shall be made free from any discrimination”97) rather than the usual 
causal language that has been held to imply but-for causation (e.g., “because 
of . . . age”98), the Supreme Court nevertheless concluded that a plaintiff who 
only proves “unequal consideration” rather than but-for causation may “seek 
injunctive or other forward-looking relief” but “cannot obtain reinstatement, 
backpay, compensatory damages, or other forms of relief related to the end 
result of an employment decision.”99 
II. A PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE NATION’S ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS 
As the previous Part explains, courts currently choose between two 
inadequate standards of causation. Moreover, as courts have attempted to 
compensate for the inadequacies of the but-for and motivating-factor tests, 
disparate-treatment proof schemes have become increasingly complex, 
inconsistent, and ineffective. The proposed approach seeks to address the 
inadequacies of the but-for and motivating-factor tests by placing the but-for 
test within the context of the broader causal framework on which it is based.100 
The but-for test is only one narrow measure of causation whereas the broader 
counterfactual reasoning that gives rise to the but-for test also allows for valid 
and well-accepted causal measures that retain the same basic logic but are far 
less restrictive than the but-for test.101 These less restrictive measures of 
counterfactual causation allow for a more appropriate standard of causation in 
disparate-treatment cases.102 
Cause and Effect in Antidiscrimination Law (Cause and Effect) provides a 
theoretical and practical examination of the proposed framework and its 
implications for the policy objectives of antidiscrimination law.103 Additionally, 
it recommends a proof scheme for disparate-treatment cases based on this 
framework, and it argues that courts can and should apply the proposed 
standard even under the causal language currently contained in the 
antidiscrimination statutes.104 In the current Part, I aim to operationalize the 
 
supra notes 39–48 and accompanying text. As explained previously, employment decisions are complex, and 
it is frequently possible for an employer to assert a sufficient legitimate purpose in retrospect. See supra notes 
1–11 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 81–95 and accompanying text. 
97.  29 U.S.C. § 633a(a). 
98.  Id. § 623(a); see also Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009). 
99.  140 S. Ct. 1168, 1177–78 (2020). 
100.  Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 487–88, 501. 
101.  Id. 
102.  See id. at 501–16; see also Hillel J. Bavli, Counterfactual Causation, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 879, 905–15 (2019) 
[hereinafter Counterfactual Causation]. 
103.  See Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at Parts III–V; see also Counterfactual Causation, supra note 102, at 
905–15. 
104.  See Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 516–36, 545–49; see also infra Part III. 
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proposed framework. In particular, I encapsulate the proposed framework in a 
simple test—which I call the fortified NESS test, or FNESS—and I argue that 
this test is suitable for immediate use by courts and legislatures as a logical and 
effective standard of causation in all disparate-treatment cases. In Part II.A, I 
formulate the FNESS standard and show how and why it applies as an ideal 
standard of causation in disparate-treatment claims. Then, in Parts II.B and 
II.C, I apply this formulation to propose concrete amendments to the nation’s 
antidiscrimination statutes. 
A. The FNESS Standard 
As a standard of causation in the antidiscrimination context, the proposed 
framework can be formulated as an adaption of the NESS test and the standard 
of causation articulated in the Restatement (Third) of Torts, with an underlying 
meaning and conceptual framework grounded in the broader counterfactual 
model of cause and effect known as the potential-outcomes framework.105 In 
simple terms, the proposed FNESS standard can be stated as follows: 
The protected characteristic is a factual cause of the adverse 
outcome if the adverse outcome would not have occurred in the 
absence of the protected characteristic—that is, if the protected 
characteristic was a but-for cause of the adverse outcome. The 
protected characteristic may also be a factual cause of the 
adverse outcome if it was one of multiple factors that preceded 
the adverse outcome, and it would have been a but-for cause of 
the adverse outcome in the absence of another factor or 
combination of factors. 
This standard employs the basic structural model of the Restatement (Third) 
of Torts, although with modifications aimed at strengthening the standard and 
adapting it for the antidiscrimination context.106 It begins with a simple 
 
105.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 26, 27 
(AM. L. INST. 2010); Tirthankar Dasgupta et al., Causal Inference from 2K Factorial Designs by Using Potential 
Outcomes, 77 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y SERIES B (STAT. METHODOLOGY) 727 (2015); Richard W. Wright, 
Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1737–41, 1788–1803 (1985); Donald B. Rubin, Estimating Causal 
Effects of Treatments in Randomized and Nonrandomized Studies, 66 J. EDUC. PSYCH. 688 (1974); see also Cause and 
Effect, supra note 10, at 501–16. 
106.  An alternative formulation is as follows: 
The protected characteristic is a factual cause of the adverse outcome if the adverse outcome 
would not have occurred in the absence of the protected characteristic. The protected 
characteristic may also be a factual cause of the adverse outcome if it was part of a set of 
antecedent factors that were sufficient for the adverse outcome, and in the absence of the 
protected characteristic, the remaining set of factors would be insufficient for the adverse 
outcome. 
This formulation leads the factfinder to an alternative, but equivalent, mode of reasoning. Linguistically and 
logically, it is more similar to the NESS formulation than that of the Restatement (Third). Like NESS, it asks 
the factfinder to consider whether the protected characteristic belonged to a sufficient set of antecedent 
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statement of the but-for test,107 followed by a broader standard that applies 
effectively to msc situations, and to disparate-treatment cases in particular.108 
At the center of the proposed standard are two innovations over current tests 
of causation in disparate-treatment cases: (1) the application of tort law’s NESS 
standard, and the adaption of it for the disparate-treatment context; and (2) a 
fortification and operationalization of this standard with the conceptual 
framework of the potential-outcomes model. 
Let us consider an example that the Supreme Court discussed in Babb v. 
Wilkie to illustrate its reasoning with respect to the any-consideration standard 
that the Court applied in that case. Assume that a company used a point system 
to make promotion decisions. Assume that a 55-year-old had a score of 85 and 
a 35-year-old had a score of 90, but that the 55-year-old also had a 5-point 
deduction based on his age, lowering his score to 80 points.109 Let us call the 
55-year-old Jim and assume that he sued his employer for its consideration of 
Jim’s age in arriving at the promotion decision. 
First, realize that, as applied to this situation, the but-for and motivating-
factor tests suffer from the problems described in Part I. Jim would be unable 
to establish a claim under the but-for test because, although the employer used 
a discriminatory formula in arriving at its promotion decision, Jim would not 
have received the promotion even in the absence of the discrimination. After 
all, even without the 5-point age-based deduction, Jim had fewer points than 
his 35-year-old colleague. A court could apply a form of the motivating-factor 
test to allow a finding of liability in this situation—as the Supreme Court did in 
Babb—but this gives rise to the wide-ranging problems discussed in Part I. For 
this reason, even in the limited circumstance in which a court is willing to 
interpret the relevant statutory language as not requiring the plaintiff to satisfy 
the element of causation with respect to the adverse employment outcome (e.g., 
“made free from any discrimination”110), as in Babb, the court will generally not 
permit the plaintiff to obtain damages or remedial injunctive relief. 
However, FNESS is different. Unlike the any-consideration standard 
applied in Babb, FNESS supplies a logic that is outcome-oriented and that 
reflects actual cause and effect. At the same time, by incorporating the statistical 
notion of a “potential outcome”—and specifically, by employing a less stringent 
form of the necessity condition within the potential-outcomes model—it 
 
factors and then to test whether the protected characteristic was necessary for the sufficiency of the set. See 
Wright, Grounds and Extent, supra note 24, at 1441. There are certain advantages of this formulation and mode 
of reasoning, but these advantages are arguably outweighed by its more technical and complex terminology. 
107.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 (AM. 
L. INST. 2010). 
108.  See id. § 27. 
109.  Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 1174 (2020). 
110.  Id. at 1171 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a)). 
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permits a finding of causation even when the discriminatory conduct does not 
satisfy the but-for standard.  
Without delving into the intricacies of the potential-outcomes model,111 the 
FNESS standard asks whether the protected characteristic was a but-for cause 
of the adverse outcome or whether it would have been a but-for cause of the 
adverse outcome in the absence of another factor or combination of factors. 
Therefore, under the FNESS standard, Jim’s age is a factual cause of his non-
promotion if, in the absence of the legitimate factor—that is, assuming Jim and 
his 35-year-old counterpart otherwise had an equal amount of points—age 
would have made the difference between Jim receiving and not receiving the 
promotion. Based on the 5-point age-based point deduction, the answer is 
“yes”—age would have meant the difference between Jim receiving and not 
receiving the promotion—and the FNESS standard is satisfied.112 Moreover, 
because, contrary to the motivating-factor test, FNESS reflects actual cause and 
effect, a plaintiff who proves a causal link between the defendant’s 
discrimination and an adverse outcome under the FNESS standard should be 
eligible—subject to a damages analysis—to obtain the full range of remedies 
available to a plaintiff who proves a discrimination claim under the but-for 
test.113 
Now, to illustrate in greater detail how FNESS differs from the but-for test, 
Figure 1 depicts a 2x2 matrix that contains potential outcomes for the example 
above—that is, values of the outcome quantity of interest that would occur for 
each combination of age and qualification.114 For simplicity, I define “age” and 
“qualification” as binary variables that take the values “Elderly” and “Not 
Elderly,” and “Strongly Qualified” and “Weakly Qualified,” respectively.115 The 
but-for test asks the factfinder to compare the two entries in the bottom row 
of the matrix: given that the plaintiff was weakly qualified for the position 
(relative to his younger counterpart), did the protected characteristic—age—
make a difference?116 The answer is “no” because comparing the entries for 
Elderly and Not Elderly, given that Jim was Weakly Qualified for the promotion 
relative to his 35-year-old counterpart, age made no difference. In other words, 
Jim would not have been promoted either way. 
 
111.  See Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 504–12 for a detailed discussion of this model; see also 
Counterfactual Causation, supra note 102, at 893–905. 
112.  For a more complex scenario—one involving three factors where any two of the factors would 
be sufficient for the adverse outcome—see infra notes 151–154 and accompanying text. 
      113.  For a discussion of damages under the proposed framework, see Cause and Effect, supra note 10, 
at 532–36. 
114.  This is a simplified application of concepts central to the potential-outcomes framework. See 
generally GUIDO W. IMBENS & DONALD B. RUBIN, CAUSAL INFERENCE FOR STATISTICS, SOCIAL, AND 
BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES: AN INTRODUCTION 3–30 (2015). 
115.  A more complex version of this example could consider a range of values for age and 
qualification. 
116.  See Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 522–23. 
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FNESS, on the other hand, asks the factfinder to consider two sets of 
counterfactuals in this example. FNESS can yield a finding of causation if the 
but-for test is satisfied—that is, if there is a contrast in potential outcomes in 
the bottom row of the 2x2 matrix (comparing the potential outcomes for 
Elderly and Not Elderly, given that Jim was Weakly Qualified). However, it can also 
yield a finding of causation if there is a contrast in potential outcomes in the top 
row of the matrix: if, assuming Jim were Strongly Qualified for the promotion 
(like his younger counterpart), being Elderly versus Not Elderly would have 
made the difference between being Promoted and Not Promoted, then FNESS 
is satisfied.117 More broadly, FNESS asks the following: in the absence of the 
legitimate factor—here, in the absence of Jim’s lesser qualifications—would the 
protected characteristic have made a difference? The answer in the example 
above is “yes”—if Jim were otherwise equally qualified for the promotion, 
being 55 rather than 35 would have meant the difference between receiving and 
not receiving the promotion.118 
Another way of understanding FNESS is as using the full set of 
counterfactuals associated with age and qualification rather than only those in 
the bottom row. If comparing Elderly to Not Elderly yields a contrast in 
potential outcomes for either Strongly Qualified or Weakly Qualified—rather 
than just for Weakly Qualified, as in the but-for test—the FNESS standard is 
satisfied.119 
 
 Not Elderly Elderly 
Strongly Qualified Promoted Not Promoted 
Weakly Qualified Not Promoted Not Promoted 
Figure 1. 2x2 matrix depicting potential outcomes in an age-based disparate-
treatment case. FNESS asks the factfinder to compare potential outcomes 
associated with age = Not Elderly to potential outcomes associated with age 
= Elderly for both qualification = Strongly Qualified and qualification = 
Weakly Qualified and to determine that age is a cause of the adverse outcome 
if either comparison exposes a contrast in potential outcomes.120 
Thus, FNESS refines the but-for test in the sense of adapting it for the 
multifactor situation. It incorporates a less restrictive and more appropriate 
version of the necessity condition, thereby allowing a finding of causation even 
when discrimination is accompanied by a sufficient legitimate factor. In this 
 
117.  See id. 
118.  See id. 
119.  Id. at 514–16. 
120.  See id. at 522–23. 
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sense, it also refines the motivating-factor test by fulfilling that test’s primary 
purpose—allowing a finding of causation in msc situations—but doing so in a 
way that is consistent with principles of counterfactual causation. In particular, 
it allows a finding of causation in msc situations based on potential outcomes 
associated with the full range of counterfactuals that arise from the factors at 
issue, rather than only those associated with the protected characteristic while 
conditioning on a particular value of the other factor (or factors).121 
Now, because FNESS is far more liberal than the but-for test—and 
specifically, because it reflects a less restrictive form of the necessity 
condition—it gives rise to certain serious concerns regarding inappropriate 
findings of liability and windfall recoveries. For example, assume that a plaintiff, 
Kevin, sued a potential employer for race-based discrimination in hiring a 
delivery driver, where the employer hired a white applicant over Kevin, an 
African-American applicant, but where Kevin did not even have a driver’s 
license or know how to drive. In this scenario, the version of the NESS test 
employed in the Restatement (Third) of Torts could expose the employer to liability. 
This is because the test would ask whether, assuming the plaintiff had a driver’s 
license, being African-American versus white would have made a difference in 
the employment decision.122 
However, the FNESS standard and the language of the amendments 
proposed herein both negate this problem definitionally through the causal 
concept of antecedence. In particular, the proposed framework identifies these 
scenarios as a form of “preemption,” or “preemptive causation”—a concept in 
the msc literature that involves a force that precedes and forecloses the 
possibility of causation by a second force.123 The proposed framework employs 
the potential-outcomes model to precisely define the concept of antecedence 
and to identify whether a legitimate purpose is “preemptive” of a discriminatory 
effect. 
A technical discussion of preemption and of the fundamental role of the 
potential-outcomes model is beyond the scope of the current Article.124 My aim 
here is to provide just an introduction and overview of the problem of 
 
121.  As explained in Cause and Effect, it would be illogical to rule out consideration of the full range of 
counterfactuals on the basis that it involves consideration of counterfactuals associated with circumstances 
that we know did not occur—for example, consideration of counterfactuals associated with Jim being equally 
qualified as his 35-year-old counterpart when we know that he was not in fact equally qualified. Id. at 512–
14. “This is because the very essence of the counterfactual model, and the but-for test in particular, is the 
comparison of counterfactuals—the inference of cause and effect based not only on what actually occurred 
but also what would have occurred, but did not, under counterfactual circumstances.” Id. at 512. Indeed, our 
intuition regarding cause and effect, as well as well-accepted scientific notions of cause and effect, frequently 
consider a broader range of counterfactuals than those considered in the but-for test. Id. For a detailed 
explanation of the logic of considering the full range of counterfactuals rather than only those associated with 
the discriminatory factor, see id. at 512–14; Counterfactual Causation, supra note 102, at 911–12. 
122.  Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 528–32. 
123.  Wright, supra note 105, at 1794–98. 
124.  For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 525–36. 
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legitimate forces as preemptive causes and how FNESS addresses it through 
the requirement of antecedence—that is, the requirement that the 
discriminatory factor precede the legitimate factor. 
To take an extreme example, assume that Diana, a woman seeking 
employment as a delivery driver, approached a man named Max. She handed 
him her resume and requested that he employ her as a delivery driver. As it 
turns out, Max is a sexist who has remarked clearly and publicly that he would 
never hire a female employee were he ever in a position to do so. However, 
Max had no opportunity to hire Diana or anyone else. Max himself was 
unemployed and looking for work. 
Max is a sexist, and if he had been given an opportunity to reject Diana’s 
application on the basis of her sex, he is very likely to have done so. However, 
in no sense can it be said that Max’s sexism was a cause of Diana’s adverse 
outcome. He was unemployed and in no position to hire anyone. 
This poses a problem for the NESS test as formulated in the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts. In particular, as with the driver’s license example above, the 
Restatement (Third)’s approach would ask whether, in the absence of the 
legitimate factor, the protected characteristic would have made a difference.125 
In this scenario, it would ask whether Diana’s sex would have made the 
difference between being hired and not being hired had Max been in a position 
to hire Diana. The answer is “yes” since it is highly likely that Max’s sexism 
would have precluded Diana’s hiring had he been in a position to hire her. 
Similarly, in the driver’s license scenario, the test would ask: in the absence of 
the legitimate factor—i.e., if Kevin in fact had a driver’s license and knew how 
to drive—would Kevin’s race have made a difference? Again, the answer is 
“yes” since it is highly likely that Kevin’s race would have precluded Kevin’s 
hiring even if Kevin had a driver’s license and knew how to drive. 
The proposed framework addresses this substantial concern through the 
concept of antecedence—a well-accepted concept in scientific, philosophic, 
and common notions of cause and effect that requires that, for a factor to 
constitute a cause of an outcome, it must precede that outcome in time.126 Again, 
a technical discussion of causal-inference concepts surrounding antecedence is 
beyond the scope of this Article.127 Simply stated, however, under the proposed 
framework, Diana’s sex cannot be a cause of her adverse employment outcome 
because at the time that Max perceived Diana’s sex, the outcome variable—to hire 
Diana or not to hire Diana as a delivery driver—was already determined.128 In 
 
125.  Id. at 540–41. 
126.  Id. at 528–31. 
127.  See id. for a detailed discussion explaining the notions of antecedence and preemption using 
statistical concepts. 
128.  See D. James Greiner & Donald B. Rubin, Causal Effects of Perceived Immutable Characteristics, 93 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 775, 775–78 (2011); D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 533, 576–79; see also Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 519–20, 528–31. For various important technical 
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other words, at the time that Max perceived Diana’s sex, the outcome of the 
employment decision was not a “random variable” that could take on multiple 
values, but was rather fixed, or determined, at a certain value—not to hire—
based on the absence of an employment opportunity. 
To borrow language from the NESS literature, the discriminatory force was 
preempted by the absence of an employment opportunity and therefore could not 
be a cause of Diana’s adverse employment outcome.129 In other words, the 
absence of an employment opportunity was a preemptive cause that precluded 
the possibility of a causal link between Diana’s sex and the adverse outcome. 
Similarly, in the driver’s license example, Kevin’s race was preempted by the 
absence of minimal qualification for the position—a driver’s license and 
knowing how to drive—and therefore could not be a cause of Kevin’s adverse 
employment outcome. 
In the FNESS formulation, this notion of antecedence is reflected in the 
requirement that to be a factual cause “[t]he protected characteristic . . . [must] 
precede[] the adverse outcome . . . .”130 In neither Diana’s case nor Kevin’s case 
did the protected characteristic precede the adverse outcome. In both cases, at 
the time that the defendant perceived the protected characteristic, the adverse 
outcome had already been determined. That is, in both cases, a legitimate factor 
preempted the protected characteristic as a cause of the adverse outcome. 
Discerning the ordering of a hypothesized causal factor (or a “treatment,” 
to use terminology from the causal-inference literature) and an outcome is 
sometimes straightforward or even obvious. Other times, however, it is more 
complex and requires clear thinking regarding the causal problem. It is 
important to realize that the question of antecedence can require judgment. For 
example, in Diana’s case above, if Max had in fact run a delivery business but 
clearly had no plans for making a new hire, it may be concluded that the absence 
of an employment opportunity preempted any possibility that discrimination 
caused the adverse employment outcome. On the other hand, if Max had in 
fact run a delivery business and had no specific plans for making a new hire—
but had a long track record of making impromptu hirings—it is less clear: perhaps, then, 
the outcome was determined only after Max perceived Diana’s sex. This would 
not necessarily imply that sex caused the adverse outcome, but antecedence is 
a prerequisite of causation. 
Sharp thinking about the causal elements—including the discriminatory 
and legitimate factors (defined as “treatments” in the causal framework), the 
 
and substantive reasons, the perception of a plaintiff’s protected characteristic is fundamental to both the timing 
and meaning of the protected characteristic as a hypothesized causal factor (or “treatment variable”). Cause 
and Effect, supra note 10, at 519–20, 528–31; Greiner & Rubin, supra, at 775–78; Greiner, supra, at 576–79. For 
purposes of antecedence in particular, the time of perception is the operative timing of the protected 
characteristic as a potential causal factor. Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 519–20. 
129.  See Wright, supra note 105, 1794–98; Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 520–21, 528–31. 
130.  Supra notes 105–106 and accompanying text. 
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employment outcome (defined as the “outcome variable”), the individual 
whose protected characteristic is at issue (defined as the “unit”), and the timing 
of the treatments, units, and outcomes—is fundamental.131 The suitability of 
FNESS therefore relies on its role as a causal measure within the broader 
potential-outcomes framework. 
Without this broader framework, one could, for example, apply FNESS to 
conclude that discrimination was a cause of a job candidate not being hired for 
a driving position even if the applicant did not have a driver’s license or even if 
there had been no open position in the first instance. Without a framework for 
defining the broader causal question and for sharply analyzing the question of 
antecedence, the FNESS standard would not function well. Additionally, the 
potential-outcomes framework provides a well-established scientific framework 
to validate the FNESS measure as an analytical process that reflects actual cause 
and effect and employs the but-for test’s central counterfactual reasoning—just 
in broader form. The potential-outcomes framework also imparts substantial 
evidentiary advantages and a better alignment between the meaning of 
causation and empirical proof thereof.132 By drawing on the conceptual 
framework of the potential-outcomes model, FNESS operationalizes the NESS 
test for effective use in antidiscrimination law. 
Importantly, although the concepts of antecedence and preemption are 
fundamental to FNESS as a coherent standard of causation, in practice, the 
complexities associated with these concepts can be largely avoided by 
incorporating the two most important forms of preemption—the absence of 
an open employment opportunity controlled by the defendant and the failure 
of the plaintiff to satisfy minimal requirements of the employment 
opportunity—directly into the disparate-treatment proof scheme, as proposed 
in Cause and Effect.133 There is strong precedent for this: both are components 
of the McDonnell Douglas criteria for establishing a prima facie discrimination 
claim under Title VII.134 
In summary, the FNESS standard refines the but-for and motivating-factor 
tests and can serve as an ideal standard of causation that can be applied simply 
and uniformly to all disparate-treatment claims. 
 
131.  Greiner & Rubin, supra note 128, at 775–78; Greiner, supra note 128, at 576–79. 
132.  For a discussion of these advantages, see Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 525–32. 
133.  See id. at 517–24. 
134.  See supra note 36 and accompanying text. Courts can adapt these factors for different contexts—
e.g., retaliation claims—as they currently adapt the McDonnell Douglas elements to suit various types of claims. 
Note that to further mitigate concerns regarding windfall recoveries while ensuring that the deterrence 
objectives of antidiscrimination law are upheld, the proposed framework allows for a damages scheme that 
permits an allocation of damages based on causation and other considerations. See Cause and Effect, supra note 
10, at 532–36 (examining possible approaches to damages); see also id. at 534 n.199 (“One way of viewing 
windfall recoveries in discrimination cases is as follows: Allowing a plaintiff to obtain a windfall recovery is 
necessary in order to deter discrimination. Moreover, a defendant arguably obtains a windfall if he commits 
discrimination and is relieved from paying damages because the plaintiff happened to be less qualified or a 
poor performer.”). 
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B. Amending the Antidiscrimination Statutes 
Legislatures generally leave the causal standard in antidiscrimination 
statutes open to judicial interpretation.135 Courts, in turn, interpret these statutes 
by choosing between two inadequate standards—the but-for test and the 
motivating-factor test. Indeed, legislatures may choose to avoid specifying a 
causal standard precisely because doing so would involve specifying an 
inadequate standard. When the choice is between two inadequate standards of 
causation, there are good arguments in favor of flexibility—in favor of relying 
on courts to interpret causal language as it applies to the particular 
circumstances of a case. 
However, these arguments fail if a suitable causal standard exists—
especially in light of the disarray that has resulted from judicial interpretation 
based on the intricacies of each statute’s causal language. As argued in Part II.A, 
FNESS is more than a suitable standard. It is ideal for disparate-treatment 
claims, and it arguably fulfills the purposes of both the but-for test and the 
motivating-factor test. Moreover, in the absence of legislation specifying the 
causal standard applicable in disparate-treatment cases, the current state of 
confusion and ineffectiveness will continue, as will the inconsistent and often-
counterintuitive outcomes that emerge under current standards. 
Therefore, I propose that legislatures amend the nation’s civil rights statutes 
to include language specifying a causal standard based on the FNESS standard 
formulated in Part II.A. In particular, I propose amending these statutes to 
include the following language: 
The term “because of” [or other causal language] implies that 
the protected characteristic must be a factual cause of the 
adverse employment outcome. The protected characteristic is a 
factual cause of the adverse outcome if the adverse outcome 
would not have occurred in the absence of the protected 
characteristic—that is, if the protected characteristic was a but-
for cause of the adverse outcome. The protected characteristic 
may also be a factual cause of the adverse outcome if it was one 
of multiple factors that preceded the adverse outcome, and it 
would have been a but-for cause of the adverse outcome in the 
absence of another factor or combination of factors. 
This language can be inserted directly into the definitions sections of Title 
VII (Section 2000e),136 the ADEA (Section 630),137 and the ADA (Section 
12102, 12103, or 12111).138 Similar language can also be inserted in the Civil 
 
135.  See supra Part I.A. 
136.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
137.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 630. 
138.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102, 12103, 12111, 12112. 
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Rights Act of 1866—either in subsection (b), which provides for the meaning 
of the statute’s term “to make and enforce contracts,” or in a new subsection.139 
Finally, this or similar language should be considered for inclusion in other 
federal and state antidiscrimination statutes not considered explicitly herein. 
C. Discussion 
The proposed amendment, like the FNESS formulation introduced in Part 
II.A, is an adaption of the NESS test and the standard of causation articulated 
in the Restatement (Third) of Torts—again with an underlying meaning and 
conceptual framework grounded in the potential-outcomes model.140 It adopts 
the basic structure and linguistic style of the Restatement (Third) but modifies it 
to strengthen the causal standard, capture the broader meaning of FNESS as a 
measure within the potential-outcomes framework, and optimize the standard 
for the antidiscrimination setting.141 
The proposed language begins in the first sentence by explicitly aligning the 
standard of causation in antidiscrimination law with the broader torts context. 
It indicates that factual causation is required to prove a discrimination claim.142 
As in the Restatement (Third), the language then proceeds to define the meaning 
of factual causation.143 
The second sentence adopts the Restatement (Third)’s articulation of the but-
for standard, which requires that “the harm would not have occurred absent 
the conduct.”144 That is, it requires that in the absence of the discrimination—
or, in particular, the protected characteristic—the adverse employment 
outcome would not have occurred.145 This component of the test operates well 
in single-factor scenarios—for example, in cases in which a plaintiff establishes 
a prima facie discrimination claim and the defendant is unable to establish a 
 
139.  Id. § 1981. 
140.  See supra notes 105–108 and accompanying text. 
141.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 26, 27 
(AM. L. INST. 2010). 
142.  See generally id. § 26 (“Tortious conduct must be a factual cause of harm for liability to be 
imposed.”). 
143.  See id. 
144.  Id. 
145.  Throughout this Article, I generally treat the protected characteristic—and specifically, the 
defendant’s perception of the protected characteristic—as the causal factor. Sometimes, I refer to 
“discrimination” as the causal factor, e.g., to emphasize that, as in all tort claims, there must be a causal link 
between the misconduct (the discrimination) and the harm (the adverse outcome). The causal factor can be 
stated in either form, but for various technical, substantive, and definitional reasons (e.g., “because of . . . 
race,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); “because of . . . age,” 29 U.S.C. § 623), it is clearer and, in certain respects, more 
precise to refer to the protected characteristic as the causal factor. As discussed previously, references to 
either discrimination or the protected characteristic as a causal factor should be interpreted in terms of the 
defendant’s perception of the protected characteristic. See supra note 128; Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 
519–20. 
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legitimate purpose. As in tort law generally, in single-factor situations, the but-
for test is simple and it comports with intuition and good policy.146 
Additionally, it is important to realize that the but-for test similarly applies 
well to many multifactor scenarios. For example, assume that an employer had 
three employees and laid off his one female employee due to a combination of 
two factors: (1) business had been slow and he no longer required three 
employees, and (2) the employer held sexist beliefs that female employees are 
less capable than male employees. In this case, the employer’s discrimination 
combined with his business and financial circumstances to bring about the 
adverse outcome. His discrimination against his female employee is a but-for 
cause of the adverse outcome: in the absence of the employer’s discrimination, 
the employee is unlikely to have been laid off. The discriminatory factor in this 
situation can be understood as a type of “necessary-but-not-sufficient” factor, 
and it is a but-for cause. 
On the other hand, the but-for test is inadequate as a test of causation in a 
specific type of multifactor scenario—situations involving multiple sufficient 
causes.147 Therefore, the third sentence of the proposed amendment applies the 
central logic of the but-for test—the necessity condition—but in a less stringent 
form, in order to allow the standard to perform well in situations involving 
more than one sufficient factor or set of factors. The test is simple: as described 
in Parts II.A and II.B, it asks the factfinder to determine whether the protected 
characteristic would be a but-for cause in the absence of another factor or 
combination of factors.148 For example, in the Babb illustration involving two 
factors—Jim’s (worse) qualifications and his (older) age—the test asks whether, 
assuming Jim and his younger counterpart were otherwise equally qualified, 
would Jim’s age have meant the difference between him receiving and not 
receiving the promotion. 
Similar to the Restatement (Third), the FNESS formulation achieves its 
simplicity by dividing the standard into two components: (1) a simple 
articulation of the but-for test, and (2) an extension for msc situations that relies 
on the but-for test but applies its reasoning in less stringent form. Moreover, 
while maintaining simple terminology and a straightforward analytical test that 
a jury can easily apply, FNESS carefully incorporates important elements of the 
 
146.  I assume that establishing factual causation in the common, scientific, and philosophic sense of 
the term is central to the objectives of tort law and antidiscrimination law in particular. This assumption has 
strong support in the case law and literature. See supra Part I.A; Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 537–38 
nn.206–07 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. 
Ct. 1009, 1013 (2020) (“Few legal principles are better established than the rule requiring a plaintiff to establish 
causation. In the law of torts, this usually means a plaintiff must first plead and then prove that its injury 
would not have occurred ‘but for’ the defendant’s unlawful conduct.”). 
147.  See supra Part I.B. 
148.  See supra notes 106–121 and accompanying text. 
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NESS test and the potential-outcomes framework.149 Relatedly, FNESS reflects 
actual cause and effect in the common, scientific, and philosophic notions of 
the term. Indeed, both components of the standard—the but-for test and the 
extension aimed at addressing msc situations—are regularly employed to infer 
cause and effect in the hard and social sciences, as well as in our common 
intuition.150 
Let us now consider how the proposed language would apply to a more 
complex case—one involving more than two factors. Assume that an employer 
promoted a male employee over Rhonda, a female employee, based on three 
factors: discrimination, performance, and education.151 Assume for simplicity 
that although Rhonda had all three factors disfavoring her in the employer’s 
promotion decision, any two of these factors would have been sufficient to 
prevent Rhonda from receiving a promotion. In this case, the employer’s 
discrimination is not a but-for cause of the adverse promotion outcome because 
Rhonda’s performance and her education were alone sufficient to preclude her 
promotion. The employer’s discrimination is, however, a cause of the adverse 
outcome under the FNESS standard because, in the absence of a legitimate 
 
149.  In Part II.A, in addition to the FNESS formulation proposed in the text, I provided a second, 
somewhat more technical, formulation of FNESS. Accordingly, an alternative way to formulate the proposed 
amendment in Part II.B is as follows: 
The term “because of” [or other causal language] implies that the protected characteristic must 
be a factual cause of the adverse employment outcome. The protected characteristic is a factual 
cause of the adverse outcome if the adverse outcome would not have occurred in the absence of 
the protected characteristic. The protected characteristic may also be a factual cause of the adverse 
outcome if it was part of a set of antecedent factors that were sufficient for the adverse outcome, 
and in the absence of the protected characteristic, the remaining set of factors would be 
insufficient for the adverse outcome.  
      This formulation, like the alternative provided in Part II.A, leads to a somewhat different—but 
equivalent—analytical process relative to the formulation in the text. This alternative has certain advantages. 
However, these advantages are arguably outweighed by the disadvantages of the more complex and technical 
language of this formulation. See supra note 106. In any event, the two formulations produce the same 
outcome. For example, if an employer promoted a male employee over Rhonda, a female employee, based 
on Rhonda’s sex and qualifications (relative to her male counterpart), where either would have been sufficient 
to prevent Rhonda’s promotion, the employer’s discrimination would not be a cause of the adverse outcome 
under the but-for test, but would be a cause under either FNESS formulation. Specifically, applying the 
formulation in the text, had Rhonda been equally qualified for the promotion relative to her male counterpart, 
her sex would nevertheless have prevented her from receiving the promotion. It is therefore a cause of the 
adverse outcome. Applying the formulation in this footnote, Rhonda’s sex was one factor in a set of 
antecedent factors—a set that included her sex but not her qualifications—that was sufficient for the 
employer not to award her the promotion, and it was necessary for the sufficiency of that set because had 
she been male rather than female, she may well have received the promotion. Her sex is therefore a cause of 
the adverse outcome under this formulation also. 
150.  See Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 501–16; Counterfactual Causation, supra note 102, at 905–15. As 
explained in Cause and Effect, the second component of the test is intended to reflect an “unconditional main-
effects” analysis in the fields of causal inference and experimental design. See Cause and Effect, supra note 10, 
at 512–16; discussion infra note 153; see generally Hillel J. Bavli & Reagan Mozer, The Effects of Comparable-Case 
Guidance on Awards for Pain and Suffering and Punitive Damages: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial, 37 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 405, 420–32 (2019); Dasgupta et al., supra note 105. 
151.  Rhonda’s performance and education can be considered in absolute terms or relative to the 
performance and education of her male colleague. 
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factor or a combination of legitimate factors, Rhonda’s sex would have meant 
the difference between her receiving the promotion and not receiving the 
promotion. In particular, had she been on equal footing with her male 
counterpart with regard to either performance or education, her sex would have 
been a but-for cause of her non-promotion.152 Had she been on equal footing 
with regard to education, for example, then her sex would have been a but-for 
cause of her non-promotion. This is because her performance and her sex 
would still have combined to prevent her promotion, whereas had she been a 
male employee, she could very well have received the promotion.153 
Finally, note the language requiring that the protected characteristic be one 
of multiple factors “that preceded” the adverse outcome. This language 
incorporates the requirement of antecedence and the exclusion of 
discrimination as a cause when it is preempted by a legitimate factor—concepts 
discussed in detail in Part II.A.154 As explained, this requirement and the role 
of the potential-outcomes framework in defining and identifying preemptive 
causes are critical to the coherent application of the proposed standard. 
Nevertheless, the question of antecedence can be greatly simplified by 
incorporating the two most important forms of preemption—the absence of 
an open employment opportunity controlled by the defendant and the failure 
of the plaintiff to satisfy minimal requirements of the opportunity—directly 
into the disparate-treatment proof scheme, as seen in McDonnell Douglas.155 
 
152.  Alternatively stated, sex was an element in a set of antecedent factors—a set containing the factors 
discrimination and performance, or a set containing the factors discrimination and education—that was 
sufficient for the occurrence of the adverse promotion outcome, and in the absence of this factor, the set—
again, containing either discrimination and performance or discrimination and education—would be 
insufficient for the occurrence of the adverse outcome. 
153.  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 27 cmt. f, illus. 3 (AM. L. INST. 2010). Another way of understanding this is explicitly in terms of the 
potential-outcomes framework. If the factor sex takes values “female” and “male,” performance takes values 
“low” and “high,” and education takes values “low” and “high” (to reflect Rhonda’s performance and 
education relative to those of her male colleague), the combination of factor values, or “levels,” that in fact 
led to the adverse outcome is sex = female, performance = low, and education = low. The but-for test asks 
whether sex = female versus sex = male made a difference in the outcome, conditional on performance = 
low and education = low. The answer is no—it made no difference. The FNESS measure employed in the 
proposed amendment, however, allows for a finding of causation if a change from sex = female to sex = 
male would make a difference when performance = low or high or education = low or high. This standard is 
satisfied in the example above because changing sex = female to sex = male would have made a difference—
i.e., sex = male would not have resulted in the adverse outcome whereas sex = female would have resulted 
in the adverse outcome—if either performance = low while education = high or performance = high while 
education = low. In other words, sex would have made a difference if, rather than conditioning on particular 
values of performance and education, we considered all possible combinations of these values. One 
alternative way of understanding this is that the employment outcome would have been different, on average, 
for sex = female versus sex = male, given certain mild assumptions. See Counterfactual Causation, supra note 
102, at 905–15. 
154.  See supra notes 122–134 and accompanying text. 
155.  See supra notes 36–38, 133–134 and accompanying text; see also Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 
517. 
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III. IMPLICATIONS 
The proposed standard carries a wide range of implications for 
antidiscrimination law. I focus on three categories of implications. First, I 
summarize the implications of the proposed standard for the fairness and 
deterrence objectives of antidiscrimination law. Second, I discuss implications 
for the courts’ interpretation of causal language in current antidiscrimination 
statutes. Third, I discuss the importance of amending the antidiscrimination 
statutes rather than relying on the courts to institute a logical causal standard. 
A. The Policy Aims of Antidiscrimination Law 
The but-for test is a simple and well-accepted standard of causation that 
performs well—in line with intuition and good policy, as well as actual cause 
and effect—in most cases.156 However, for the reasons discussed above, the 
but-for test is inadequate as a test of causation in msc situations, and disparate-
treatment cases in particular.157 The purpose of the substantial-factor test is to 
address the inadequacy of the but-for test in msc situations.158 The purpose of 
the motivating-factor test—an adaption of the substantial-factor test for the 
antidiscrimination context—is to address the inadequacy of the but-for test in 
disparate-treatment cases and other msc situations in the antidiscrimination 
context.159 This test is, however, at least equally problematic. Among other 
problems, it is inherently vague, and it does not reflect actual cause and effect.160 
The FNESS standard retains the central component of the but-for test—
the necessity condition—but in a less restrictive form. It accomplishes the aims 
of both the but-for test and the motivating-factor test while eliminating the 
negative aspects of each. Like the but-for test, the FNESS standard involves a 
simple, logical test that reflects actual cause and effect. Indeed, it is based on 
the same causal framework and the same counterfactual reasoning. At the same 
time, it avoids the primary weakness of the but-for test by extending the 
counterfactual reasoning to permit a logical and intuitive application to 
multifactor situations. As such, the FNESS standard fulfills the core function 
of the motivating-factor test: it allows findings of causation in msc situations, 
thereby permitting outcomes that are consistent with common sense and good 
 
156.  See generally DOBBS ET AL., supra note 6, at 317. 
157.  See supra Part I.B. 
158.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 cmt. 
j (AM. L. INST. 2010). 
159.  See supra Part I; Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 494–501. 
160.  See supra Part I.B. 
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policy.161 At the same time, the FNESS standard does not suffer from the 
substantial weaknesses of the motivating-factor test. In particular, rather than 
abandoning a standard that reflects actual cause and effect in favor of a test that 
relies on intuition regarding responsibility, FNESS employs a well-established 
analytical process that reflects actual cause and effect. 
A detailed analysis of the fairness and deterrence objectives of 
antidiscrimination law and the implications of FNESS with respect to these 
objectives is beyond the scope of this Article.162 However, even without a 
thorough examination, it is clear from precedent and bedrock principles of tort 
law that a causal standard in antidiscrimination law should have three 
fundamental features of causation: (1) the standard should yield a finding of 
causation when the but-for test is satisfied, (2) the standard should be capable 
of yielding a finding of causation even when discrimination is accompanied by 
sufficient legitimate factors, and (3) the standard of causation should involve 
reasoning that reflects actual cause and effect. If a causal standard lacks one of 
these three features, it will lead to legal outcomes that do not align with the 
fairness and deterrence objectives of tort law, and antidiscrimination law in 
particular. 
First, there is overwhelming support for the proposition that a factor 
should be deemed a cause of an outcome when it is a but-for cause of that 
outcome. The but-for test is by far the dominant test of causation in tort law.163 
It is the default test of causation in law, in everyday references to cause and 
effect, and in clear Supreme Court precedent in discrimination cases. As the 
Supreme Court has stated clearly in its 2020 decision in Comcast Corp. v. National 
Ass’n of African American-Owned Media, “Few legal principles are better 
established than the rule requiring a plaintiff to establish causation. In the law 
of torts, this usually means a plaintiff must first plead and then prove that its 
injury would not have occurred ‘but for’ the defendant’s unlawful conduct.”164 
The Court followed well-established precedent that “[i]t is . . . textbook tort law 
that an action ‘is not regarded as a cause of an event if the particular event 
would have occurred without it.’”165 Thus, “[t]his ancient and simple ‘but for’ 
common law causation test . . . supplies the ‘default’ or ‘background’ rule 
 
161.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 cmt. 
j (AM. L. INST. 2010) (explaining that the substantial-factor test’s “primary function was to permit the 
factfinder to decide that factual cause existed when there were multiple sufficient causes”). 
162.  For a detailed examination of the implications of FNESS for the fairness and deterrence 
objectives of antidiscrimination law, see Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 536–45. 
163.  See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 6, at 317. 
164.  140 S. Ct. 1009, 1013 (2020). 
165.  Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 347 (2013) (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra 
note 27, at 265). 
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against which Congress is normally presumed to have legislated when creating 
its own new causes of action,” including antidiscrimination causes of action.166 
Second, there is strong support for the proposition that the converse of 
item (1) does not hold. Specifically, courts and Congress have made clear that 
an ideal standard of causation should be capable of permitting a finding of 
causation even in msc situations—that is, even when discrimination is 
accompanied by sufficient legitimate factors. This is clear from the 
abandonment of the but-for test in msc situations in tort law, as well as caselaw 
and legislation that limit the applicability of the but-for test in certain 
antidiscrimination contexts.167 As indicated in Part I, courts have struggled 
immensely to preserve the requirement of actual causation while permitting 
liability in certain disparate-treatment cases even when discrimination is 
accompanied by other sufficient factors.168 The Supreme Court has attempted 
to accomplish this via burden-shifting schemes involving both the but-for test 
and the motivating-factor test, as has Congress in its amendments to Title VII. 
As Justice O’Connor stated in her concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse: 
There is no doubt that Congress considered reliance on gender or race in 
making employment decisions an evil in itself. . . . Reliance on such factors is 
exactly what the threat of Title VII liability was meant to deter. While the main 
concern of the statute was with employment opportunity, Congress was 
certainly not blind to the stigmatic harm which comes from being evaluated 
by a process which treats one as an inferior by reason of one’s race or sex. 
This Court’s decisions under the Equal Protection Clause have long 
recognized that whatever the final outcome of a decisional process, the 
inclusion of race or sex as a consideration within it harms both society and 
the individual.169 
Importantly, having a causal standard that permits a finding of causation 
even when a discriminatory purpose is accompanied by other sufficient factors 
does not imply that it would require a finding of causation in such circumstances. 
While Congress and the courts have generally required a but-for standard of 
 
166.  Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1014 (quoting Nassar, 570 U.S. at 346–47); see also Burrage v. United 
States, 571 U.S. 204, 210–11 (2014) (“‘Results from’ imposes, in other words, a requirement of actual causality. 
In the usual course, this requires proof that the harm would not have occurred in the absence of—that is, 
but for—the defendant’s conduct.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Gross v. FBL Fin. 
Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176–78 (2009) (holding that “the ordinary meaning of the ADEA’s requirement 
that an employer took adverse action ‘because of’ age is that age was the ‘reason’ that the employer decided 
to act,” meaning that “under the plain language of the ADEA . . . a plaintiff must prove that age was the ‘but-
for’ cause of the employer’s adverse decision”). 
167.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 (AM. 
L. INST. 2010); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (AM. L. INST. 1965); KEETON ET AL., supra note 
27 (“[T]here is one type of situation in which [the but-for test] fails. If two causes concur to bring about an 
event, and either one of them, operating alone, would have been sufficient to cause the identical result, some 
other test is needed.”). 
168.  See supra Parts I.A–B. 
169.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 265 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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causation, they have made clear that an ideal causal standard would be capable 
of yielding a finding of causation—although not necessarily requiring such a 
finding—in msc situations. In other words, they have made clear that an ideal 
causal standard would not altogether preclude causation simply because 
discrimination is accompanied by a second sufficient factor. 
Third, it is an ironclad principle of law—and tort and antidiscrimination 
law in particular—that a plaintiff must establish a causal link between the 
defendant’s misconduct and the plaintiff’s injury, and that this causal link must 
reflect actual cause and effect. As the Supreme Court has stated, “When the law 
grants persons the right to compensation for injury from wrongful conduct, 
there must be some demonstrated connection, some link, between the injury 
sustained and the wrong alleged. The requisite relation between prohibited 
conduct and compensable injury is governed by the principles of 
causation . . . .”170 As the Supreme Court has recently reiterated, “Few legal 
principles are better established than the rule requiring a plaintiff to establish 
causation.”171 Simply stated, “Tortious conduct must be a factual cause of harm 
for liability to be imposed.”172 
The but-for test inheres features (1) and (3) but lacks feature (2), while the 
motivating-factor test is designed to inhere feature (2) but lacks features (1) and 
(3). The FNESS standard, however, entails all three fundamental features of 
causation: it yields a finding of causation when the but-for test is satisfied, it 
permits a finding of causation even when discrimination is accompanied by 
sufficient legitimate factors, and it employs simple reasoning that reflects actual 
cause and effect. By employing a less stringent form of the necessity condition 
(the central logic of the but-for test) to better account for multifactor situations, 
the FNESS standard refines and unifies the but-for and motivating-factor tests, 
and it achieves the fairness and deterrence objectives of antidiscrimination law 
better than either of these tests can individually.173 
 
170.  Nassar, 570 U.S. at 342. 
171.  Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1013; see supra notes 163–166 and accompanying text. 
172.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 (AM. L. 
INST. 2010); see DOBBS ET AL., supra note 6, at 312–17 (explaining the requirement of factual causation); 
Counterfactual Causation, supra note 102, at 900–02 (arguing that “[f]actual causation is intended to capture the 
meaning of ‘actual,’ or ‘scientific,’ cause and effect,” and citing sources); David W. Robertson, Causation in the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Three Arguable Mistakes, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, 1008 (2009) (“[T]he 
cause-in-fact requirement is the ‘linchpin’ of the corrective-justice theory. Indeed, it has long been regarded 
as a truism that ‘a defendant should never be held liable to a plaintiff for a loss where it appears that his 
wrong did not contribute to it, and no policy or moral consideration can be strong enough to warrant the 
imposition of liability in such [a] case.’” (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (first quoting Larry 
A. Alexander, Causation and Corrective Justice: Does Tort Law Make Sense?, 6 LAW & PHIL. 1, 12 (1987); and then 
quoting Charles E. Carpenter, Concurrent Causation, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 941, 947 (1935))). 
173.  Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 489, 554. 
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B. Interpreting Causal Language in Antidiscrimination Statutes 
Causal language in current antidiscrimination statutes can and should be 
interpreted to include the FNESS standard. This follows from the analysis 
above indicating that FNESS can be viewed as a refinement of the but-for and 
motivating-factor tests, given that courts currently interpret such language as 
implying one of these two tests. Moreover, it is clear from dictionary entries 
associated with causal language in the antidiscrimination statutes—a source 
commonly relied on by the Supreme Court and lower courts for interpreting 
such language174—that causal terms such as “because of,” “results from,” and 
“based on” incorporate the scientific meaning of cause and effect, which 
includes the FNESS measure.175 
Thus, although courts have interpreted such language in antidiscrimination 
statutes to imply but-for causation based on the dictionary meaning of the 
language,176 they would be justified to extend this reasoning to interpret such 
language as implying the FNESS standard, which itself is an extension of the 
central logic of the but-for test adapted for the multifactor context and 
disparate-treatment claims in particular.177 Moreover, as Justice O’Connor and 
others have highlighted, Congress almost certainly intended to target 
discriminatory conduct, or the reliance on race or gender, in making 
employment decisions—even if it does not amount to a but-for cause.178 
Regardless of whether Congress explicitly had the broader meaning of the 
necessity condition in mind when formulating Title VII and other 
antidiscrimination statutes, it is this meaning—and not the but-for or 
motivating-factor tests—that most comports with the policy objectives of the 
antidiscrimination statutes, as well as with the ordinary and scientific notions of 
cause and effect in disparate-treatment cases and other multifactor situations.179 
Finally, in circumstances in which courts have employed the motivating-
factor test, this test is arguably no longer justified in light of FNESS. In 
considering this proposition, let us immediately put aside two categories of 
cases. First, the Supreme Court has been clear that causal terms such as 
“because of,” “results from,” and “based on” imply factual causation and 
generally preclude use of the motivating-factor test to satisfy the causal 
requirement.180 Cases involving such language are discussed immediately 
 
174.  Id. at 545–49; see, e.g., Nassar, 570 U.S. at 350; Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 
(2009); Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 210–11 (2014). 
175.  Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 545–49. 
176.  See supra Part I.A. 
177.  Interpreting the causal language in current antidiscrimination statutes to include the FNESS 
standard can be understood as an extension of existing Supreme Court precedent rather than a deviation 
from it. 
178.  See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
179.  Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 548–49. 
180.  See supra Part I. 
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above.181 Second, there are certain statutes that have explicitly incorporated in 
the language of the statute the possibility of a motivating-factor test as an 
alternative to but-for causation.182 I have, however, already discussed—as a 
matter of policy rather than statutory interpretation—the problems associated 
with the motivating-factor test and the policy reasons to employ the FNESS 
standard.183 
Thus, we are left here with a relatively narrow category of cases that are not 
clearly governed by the motivating-factor test or the but-for test based on 
statutory language. In these cases, however, when courts have interpreted vague 
causal language to imply the motivating-factor test (or some variation thereof), 
this interpretation is based on the presumed absence of an alternative to the 
but-for and motivating-factor tests, combined with the conclusion that, for a 
particular statute, Congress must have intended to capture as a cause an 
employer’s consideration of a protected characteristic, even if such 
consideration did not affect the outcome of an employment decision.184 For 
this reason, although courts may allow a finding of liability in these cases, they 
generally place severe limits on the relief that can be obtained by a plaintiff who 
cannot establish but-for causation.185 
For example, in the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in Babb v. Wilkie, the 
Court interpreted the relevant language of the federal-sector provision of the 
ADEA—“shall be made free from any discrimination based on age”186—as 
only requiring “that personnel actions be untainted by any consideration of 
age.”187 However, while the Court permitted a finding of liability for a plaintiff 
who can prove “unequal consideration,” it held that if the plaintiff is unable to 
prove but-for causation, the relief that the plaintiff can obtain is limited to 
“injunctive or other forward-looking relief” and does not include 
“reinstatement, backpay, compensatory damages, or other forms of relief 
related to the end result of an employment decision.”188 Title VII similarly 
places severe limits on the relief that can be obtained by a plaintiff who proves 
that discrimination was a motivating factor but not a but-for cause of an 
employment decision.189 
Therefore, although courts have in limited circumstances—based on the 
language of a statute—permitted a finding of liability under the motivating-
factor test, they have been reluctant to do so, and they have so limited the relief 
 
181.  See supra notes 176–179 and accompanying text. 
182.  See supra Part I.A. 
183.  See supra Parts I–III. 
184.  See supra Part I. 
185.  See supra Part I. 
186.  29 U.S.C. § 633a(a). 
187.  140 S. Ct. 1168, 1171 (2020). 
188.  Id. at 1177–78. 
189.  See supra notes 42–46. 
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available to a plaintiff that proves a claim under the motivating-factor test, but 
not the but-for test, as to render the law relatively ineffective with respect to 
such claims. This treatment again results from the fact that—as with the 
substantial-factor test in other torts contexts—courts allow the motivating-
factor test only as a workaround to the inability of the but-for test to yield a 
finding of causation in msc situations. The test is, however, inconsistent with 
the fundamental legal rule requiring a plaintiff to prove causation, leading to 
inconsistencies, confusion, and judicial reluctance in applying this test, as well 
as unusual limits on relief. 
The motivating-factor test is thus applied only as a result of a combination 
of two factors: (1) a court’s conclusion that for a particular statute, Congress 
must have intended to outlaw discrimination even when it did not “make a 
difference” with respect to an employment decision; and (2) the presumption 
that there is no alternative to the but-for test that would both reflect actual 
cause and effect and permit a finding of causation even when discrimination is 
accompanied by other sufficient factors. After all, the requirement of causation 
is beyond reproach. It is fundamental to longstanding tradition and to the 
fairness and other objectives of tort law. Congress surely could not be presumed 
to have intended its abandonment if an alternative standard exists that both 
reflects actual cause and effect and addresses the inadequacy of the but-for test 
as applied to msc situations. 
FNESS supplies such a standard. In light of this, and for the reasons 
discussed earlier in this Part, courts arguably are not justified in interpreting 
statutes that contain vague causal language to require or allow a motivating-
factor test. Rather, if a statute does not require but-for causation and does not 
specify the motivating-factor test as an alternative to the but-for test, courts 
should consider generally interpreting it as requiring the plaintiff to satisfy 
FNESS. Moreover, because, unlike the motivating-factor test, FNESS reflects 
actual cause and effect, a plaintiff who proves that discrimination is a FNESS 
cause of an adverse outcome should be eligible to obtain the full range of 
remedies that would be available to her had she proved her case under the but-
for test—including damages and remedial injunctive relief. 
C. The Importance of Amending the Antidiscrimination Statutes 
In Part III.B, I explained why courts can and arguably should apply the 
FNESS standard even under the causal language of current antidiscrimination 
statutes. However, legislatures should not leave the causal standard for judicial 
interpretation. Legislatures should consider amending the antidiscrimination 
statutes to incorporate the FNESS standard pursuant to the language provided 
in Part II.B. 
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As discussed previously, legislatures have generally left the issue of 
causation to judicial interpretation.190 This has caused confusion, inconsistency, 
and ineffectiveness, as courts have individually applied inadequate standards on 
a statute-by-statute, case-by-case basis while interweaving complexities and 
loose logic to compensate for the standards’ inadequacies and arrive at 
acceptable outcomes. The legislatures may well have been correct to leave the 
issue of causation to the courts. After all, a legislature would have had to decide 
between two inadequate standards—the but-for test and the motivating-factor 
test—and the inadequacies of the chosen standard would undoubtedly result in 
counterintuitive and counterproductive outcomes. Therefore, rather than 
prescribing an inadequate standard, legislatures have left the causal standard to 
the courts. Courts have substantial experience interpreting the meaning and 
intention of legislation and navigating the complexities of causation. Moreover, 
they are able to develop causal standards more intricately through common law 
and to tailor their application to particular cases. 
However, leaving the causal standard to judicial interpretation is just the 
best of poor alternatives when legislatures and courts must choose between two 
inadequate standards. This is not the case when a good option exists. FNESS 
can easily be incorporated into antidiscrimination statutes pursuant to Part II.B, 
and it can be applied simply and effectively to discrimination cases brought 
under these statutes. The proposed language applies to single-factor cases and 
multifactor cases, and it follows well-established methods in tort law. 
Importantly, the proposed amendment does not reinvent the wheel. 
Rather, it builds on and adapts the NESS test and the approach to causation in 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts, and it fortifies this method with a robust causal 
framework that draws on the meaning and methods of cause and effect in the 
sciences and their relationship to causation in the broader torts context. 
The proposed amendment ensures a consistent and effective application of 
the FNESS standard. It provides a clear test that courts can apply simply across 
the full spectrum of disparate-treatment cases. At the same time, the 
fundamental features of a particular causal question must be specified based on 
the particular facts of a case.191 The proposed amendment therefore allows 
substantial flexibility for a court to craft its application of FNESS based on the 
details of a case. Moreover, because the proposed language builds on standards 
and caselaw from the msc torts context, courts can turn to this body of law to 
develop their applications of the FNESS standard. 
In summary, because FNESS provides a logical and effective standard that 
reflects actual cause and effect and that can be applied in all disparate-treatment 
cases, legislatures should consider amending the antidiscrimination statutes to 
incorporate this standard. 
 
190.  See supra Parts I.A, II.B. 
191.  See Cause and Effect, supra note 10, at 505–12, 525–31. 
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CONCLUSION 
Legal standards surrounding causation in disparate-treatment claims 
require repair. The inadequacies of the but-for and motivating-factor tests have 
thrown antidiscrimination law into a state of disarray. The proposed FNESS 
standard resolves these inadequacies and is capable of restoring logic and 
effectiveness to this area of the law. The proposed framework applies the NESS 
test and a predominant model of cause and effect in the sciences—the 
potential-outcomes model—to develop a causal standard that is suitable for 
msc situations, and disparate-treatment claims in particular. 
This Article operationalizes the proposed framework by encapsulating it in 
a simple test for courts and legislatures to apply as the standard of causation in 
all disparate-treatment cases. It is sufficiently simple for juries to apply even to 
complex fact patterns. At the same time, it builds on established methods in 
tort law, it comports with good policy and legislative intent, and it reflects actual 
cause and effect. 
After formulating the FNESS standard, the Article applies this standard to 
propose concrete amendments to the antidiscrimination statutes. Although I 
show that courts can and arguably should apply FNESS under the causal 
language in current antidiscrimination statutes, I argue that in light of the 
availability of FNESS as a standard of causation, legislatures are not justified to 
leave the causal standard open to judicial interpretation. Rather, they should 
consider adopting FNESS for incorporation in the antidiscrimination statutes 
and thereby restore the effectiveness of disparate-treatment litigation and 
promote the crucial aims of antidiscrimination law. 
 
